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NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-Searches and Seizures-Tapping of
Telephone Wires-Admissibility of Evidence. By a five to four
decision, the Supreme Court of the United States recently removed another stone from the protecting wall of liberty and personal security which was erected by our constitution and to which
we have all pointed with pride. The decision referred to was
handed down in three cases involving prosecutions for a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. Olmstead et al.
v. United States; Green et al. v. United States; Mclnnis et al. v.
United States; 48 S. C. Rep. 564. Some idea of the magnitude of
the conspiracy may be formed from the statement that "in a bad
month sales amounted to $176,000." The one decision covers the
three cases. The petitioners therein were convicted in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act,
and the conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Seventy-two others were originally included in the indictments. Writs of Certiorari were granted
solely to determine the question of the admissibility of evidence
of private telephone conversations obtained by the federal prohibition agents by tapping telephone wires. By the statutes of
Washington wire tapping is made a crime. The information
which led to the discovery of the conspiracy was obtained almost
entirely by this method. Petitioners sought to have such evidence excluded on the ground that it was obtained by methods
prohibited under the Fourth Amendment and that its admission
constituted a violation of petitioners' rights under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..." The
majority opinion holds that the method of obtaining evidence in
this case did not involve a violation of that amendment. The
tapping of the wires was effected on lines extending from the
residences of some of the petitioners to the central office. The
federal agents did not enter the office nor the homes of the peti-
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tioners; the connections were made in the street outside of the
residences and in the basement of the office building. It is this
conduct which the highest tribunal in the land has held does not
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.
The majority opinion stresses the point that under the common law rule, which obtains in Washington, "the admissibility
of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which
it was obtained." It later calls attention to the fact, however,
that the same court, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S.
Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. i915B, 834, Ann. Cas. .1915C, 1177,
recognized an exception fo the common law rule where the evidence is obtained. through a violation of the fourth and Fifth
Amendments. The decision, therefore, that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment disposed of the all-important point
in the case. In .treating of this point the opinion states: "The
language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the
defendant's house or office", and even though, as is conceded in
the opinion, those amendments are to be liberally construed to
effect the purpose of the framers of the constitution, "that cannot
justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers and effects. .... "
The Fifth Amendment provides:

"No person . . . shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
The majority opinion held that since the conversations of the petitioners were not compulsory in any way there could be no cause
for complaint uhder this provision.
The chief dissenting opinion .was written by Mr. Justice
Brandeis. In justifying his position .that the constitutional
amendment applies to the present case, he says: "Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of
power, must have a similar capacity of. adaptation to a changing
world ....
When the Fourth and Fifth Aiiendments were adopted.
'the form that evil had therefore taken' had been necessarily simple .... But 'time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes'. . . . Discovery and invention have made

it possible for the government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of 'what
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is whispered in the closet. .

-.

As a means of espionage, writs of

assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of
tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping."
"The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much
broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.... They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefstheir thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use,
as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such
intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth."
"It is, of course, immaterial where the physical connection
with the telephone wires leading into the defendants premises
was made. And it is also immaterial that the intrusion was in
aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes
are beneficient ....

The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insid-

ious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
Justice Brandeis was not content with attacing tne aomissibility of such evidence under the constitutional provision. He
also based his contention upon the broad and fundamental principle of the self-preservation of our courts. In order to preserve
itself the court must re-quire that those who invoke its aid must
come with clean hands. To do otherwise would breed contempt
for our laws, make our judicial processes a means of extending
rather than limiting the field of crime, and make the administration of justice practically impossible.
Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Butler, and Mr. Justice
Stone wrote dissenting opinions.
It is said that the government did not authorize the commission of these crimes on the part of its agents. In reference
thereto, the government in its brief states: "The Prohibition
Unit of the Treasury disclaims it and the Department of Justice
has frowned on it." True, it did not tell its agents in advance to
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use such methods in obtaining evidence in this case. But when
they had in fact obtained the evidence by the commission of a
crime, the government not only did not refuse to participate in
the fruits of the crime, but it insisted on the right to use the same
in the prosecution of the petitioners herein. The government,
therefore, became morally responsible for these acts to the same
extent as if it had originally authorized them. Even though the
agents were not directed to commit a crime, the government by
availing itself of the fruits thereof has unequivocally placed its
stamp of approval thereon. We have, then, this deplorable state
of affairs-the federal government paying its agents for the commission of crime' against the state of Washington. Could anything be more subversive of the principles of federal government?
Such a struggle between the state and national governments, if
long continued, cannot but result in the entire subordination of
one to the other,-a condition wholly at variance with and destructive to our political institutions, of which in the past we have
been justly proud.
The decision seems to attach some importance to the fact
that there was no trespass upon the property of the defendants.
It would seem that such is not consonant with the facts of the
case. Presumaoiy, petitioners were in possession and had exclusive right to the use of the telephone wires while these conversations were being carried on. Doubtless petitioners paid a
consideration to the telephone company for such use and possession. There is, therefore, absolutely no foundation for the assertion that no trespass was committed upon their property.
The opinion as a whole portrays vividly the shameful conditions engrafted upon our fair country by the adoption of the
Eighteenth Amendment and the passage of the National Prohibition Act, and also the utter disregard for law and personal rights
which has become the almost invariable accompaniment of the
efforts on the part of our enforcement officers to compel compliance with the law. Greater cause for alarm arises from the
fact tha hese outrages are perpetrated in the name of justice by
the very ones to whom has been entrusted in large measure the
enforcement of our laws and who should be the last to trample
them underfoot. Everything possible should be done to prevent such an abomination of the principles upon which our fed-
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eral government is founded, and the first step in that direction
should be the refusal of our courts to recognize such nefarious
conduct on the part of federal officers in any manner whatsoever,
except in the prosecution of the officials themselves for the commission of such offenses. Thus will we revert to an observance
of the maxim, "Our liberties we prize ,and our rights we will
maintain."
Henry Hasley.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Settlement could be made
out of court by providing for payment of attorney's lien out of
settlement.. Levy et al. v. Grand Central Wicker Shop, 249 N. Y.
168, 163, N. E. 244.
This was an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court
Appellate Division First Department, (N. Y.).
The plaintiffs in this case were attorneys who represented
John Coleman in an action against the Grand Central Wicker
Shop. The plaintiff in that action had agreed that the attorneys
should have as their fees, forty per cent of the amount recovered
in the suit. There was a judgment given Coleman for $12,500,
forty per cent of which was attorneys fees. Thereafter the plaintiff, pending an appeal, settled with the'defendant c.ompany for
$2,000, of which $800 represents the attorneys fees. The question
is whether the plaintiff Coleman might settle with the defendants
and release the judgment, despite an agreement with his attorneys
for a contingent fee of forty per cent of the amount recovered.
The settlement was made in good faith, with the consent of
the court and with notice to the attorneys.
The attorneys contend that their position is that of an equitable assignee of the judgment and as such their fee is to be based
upon the judgment and not the amount of the settlement. It has
been held in Serwver v. Serwer, 86 N. Y. S. 838, that court has no
power after judgment to authorize a settlement which transfers
the attorney's lien to the amount received in settlement, but the
attorneys are entitled to the amount contracted for. However in
Corcoran v. George Kelloge Structural Co. 166 N. Y. S. 269, it was.
held that, pending an appeal, the plaintiff has the right to make a
settlement for less than the judgmefit providing he acts in good
faith and gives notice to the attorneys, and provides payment for
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attorneys from the settlement. The client has the right to determine whether he shall pursue the action or make a settlement
in good faith. He may not however cheat his attorneys. The
attorneys have a right to pursue their fee and insist that the share
be ascertained and paid, 66 N. E. 397. This rule may be applied
to settlements both before and after judgment. This does not
defeat the attorneys lien'as argued by the plaintiffs. This rule is
based upon the fairness of the settlement made. Order affirmed.
In accord. 102 N. Y. S. 374.
J. P. Berscheid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Constitutionality of classification of subjects of taxation-Requirements of classification for
purposes of taxation.
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. and others brought
action against Rufus A. Doughton, Commissioner of Revenue of
North Carolina, to recover money paid by each of the plaintiffs
to the defendant as a license tax for the privilege of maintaining
and operating chain stores in the state of North Carolina, the tax
being provided for by a statute, alleged to be null and void as
contravening the Constitution of North Carolina, and Section 1
of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. et al. v. Doughton, Commissioner
of Revenue of North Carolina, 1928. 144 S.E. 701.
The statute, passed by the legislature for the purpose of raising revenue for payment of the expenses of the state government,
provided that "any person, firm, corporation or association operating or maintaining within this state, under the same general
management, supervision or ownership, six or more stores or
mercantile establishments, shall pay a license tax of $50 for each
such store for the privilege of operating such stores or mercantile
establishments." The plaintiffs were partnerships composed of
citizens of the state, and corporations organized in the state, or
licensed to do business there, and alleged that the tax was not
imposed in the exercise of the police power of the state, but was
imposed merely as a tax for the purpose of revenue, and that the
classification for this purpose was arbitrary, unreasonable, and
unjust.
The section of the Constitution of North Carolina alleged to
have been violated provided that "laws shall be passed taxing, by
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uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments and bonds, stocks,
joint stock companies, or otherwise; also all real and personal
property according to its true value in money". The same section further provided that "the General Assembly may also tax
trades, professions, franchises and incomes". In State v. Williams,
73 S. E. 1000, it was held that the rule uniformly applies to such
taxes as well as to taxes on property. Although, therefore, the
power of the Legislature to classify the subjects of such taxation
has been recognized, this power must be exercised subject to the
limitation that the classification must not be arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust; there must be some real and substantial difference
to justify the classification.
Article 14, sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United States,
also alleged to have been violated, provides that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdictinn the equal protection
of the laws". In deciding this question, the court held the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are controlling
and must be accepted as authoritative. Although it has been
held that this provision does not prohibit classification for purposes of taxation, it is also true that the classification must be
reasonable and based on a real and substantial difference having
a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.
Quaker City Cab Co. v.Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 48 Sup. Ct.
553. 'If therefore, the statute in question was contrary to the Constitution of North Carolina, it also contravened the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Since other merchants doing a similar business within the
state were not required to pay the tax merely because they operated fewer stores than did plaintiffs, it was held that the classification was arbitrary; the business of plaintiffs differed from that
of the owners of fewer stores only in matters of detail and methods of buying and selling merchandise. Such a classification was
unjust and unreasonable and deprived plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws.
The tax was also condemned on the grounds that it was directed against stores operated under the same general management or ownership, which was held to be an arbitrary distinction;
also, when the sixth store was taxed, the tax became retroactive
because the first five, as well as the sixth, became subject to a tax
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to which they had not been subject before. It was therefore decided by the court that the statute was in opposition to both the
Constitution of North Carolina and to the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution of the 'United States, and as a result, was null
and void.
J. J. Canty.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equitable relief-Exclusion
of negroes from democratic state primary election.
In the case of Grigsby et al. v. Harriset al. reported in 27 Federal Reporter (2nd series) 942, equitable relief was sought against
the Democratic State Executive Committe for excluding negroes
from participation in the Democratic primary election-'pursuant
to Rev. St. Tex. 1925, article 3107, providing that a political party
through its state executive committee has power to prescribe
qualifications of its own members and determine who shall be
qualified to vote in such party.
The opinion, written by Judge Hutcheson, of District Court
of the United States for the Southern District of Texas, holds that
the action complained of was purely a party action, as to which
like other voluntary associations, the party has a complete delectus personarum, and may select or reject as members whom it
will.
Although the whole opinion is not given and it does not appear how the court ruled as to the constitutionality of the Texas
statute, apparently the statute as it stands, is constitutional both
as to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Federal
Constitution because every state has the right to prescribe the
qualifications of its own citizens whether voting in a state or a
federal election, Minor v. Happersett,21 Wallac.e 162 (U. S.), 22
Law Edition 627; Pope v. Williams, 193 (U. S.) 621, 24 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 573, 48 Law Edition 817.
Not enough of the facts are given in the case to understand
the courts ruling, but it will be interesting to know when the case
is fully published how the court arrived at its decision and the
reasons given in support of it, together with the authorities cited
on the subject.
I. Angelino.
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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Plucker v. C. M. St.
P. Ry. Co. The plaintiff, Pldcker, alleges that he was seriously injured, and his automobile completely destroyed by a collision
with the defendant's train. He claimed damages to his person in
the sum of $10,000 and to his automobile in the sum of $500. The
plaintiff received judgement in the lower court and the defendant
was granted a new trial on the ground of contributory negligence.
The defendant contends that the evidence shows that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, barring a recovery against the defendant.
The accident occured at a grade crossing where the plaintiff
was struck by one of the defendant's trains. It was a dangerous
crossing through a deep cut and a train could not be seen either
way until two or three feet from the tracks. The cut and the
crossing were well known to him, and he well knew that he could
not see a train coming until he was within two feet of the track.
He was driving at the rate of 6 miles an hour.
The engineer of the defendant Railroad failed to ring the bell
or sound the whistle, and the plaintiff contends, that his negligence, if any, was caused by the failure of the company to comply with the rules.
The court held that the plaintiff knowing that he could not
see a train within 2 feet of the track, was negligent in driving at
a rate of speed which must carry him within striking distance of
a train, if a train was coming, before he could stop his car.
Failure of the engineer to ring the bell or sound the whistle
did not relieve the plaintiff from the necessity of taking ordinary
precaution. Negligence of the company's employee is no excuse for negligence on the part of the plaintiff. This case was decided in 219 N. W. 254, May 4, 1928.
On this point 22 R. C. L. 1018, par. 250 says:
"At an obstructed crossing it is the duty of a traveler to exercise a greater degree of care and caution than is incumbent upon
him usually, and common prudence requires him to approach at
such speed that when an approaching train may be seen he may
be able to stop and allow it to pass. The greater the danger, the
greater the care necessary for him to exercise and the greater
caution necessary to constitute ordinary care."
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Plucker v. C. M. St. P. Ry. Co. is followed by many other
cases decided in different states. 124 Ind. 280; 8 L. R. A. 539;
20 So. 207; 182 Cal. 369; 178 Wis. 513; 195 Iowa 86, 190 N. W. 21;
241 S. W. 671; 120 Wash. 91; 237 S. W. 1018; 27 N. M. 349; 224
Mich. 91; 107 Ore. 587; 112 Kans. 402; 297 Mo. 633; 257 S. W.
469; 95 U. S. 697; 24 L. Ed. 542; 118 Fed. 234.
F. Earl Lamboley.
CORPORATIONS-Acceptance of stock in consolidated
corporation by minority stock holders not consenting to consolidation held not ratification of consolidation where they believed
themselves bound by decision of majority.
Action by the minority stockholders of Garrett Sheep Company to set aside a merger of the company with the defendant
company and to have reconveyed to the Garrett Company its
assets, or, in lieu thereof, for the value of plaintiffs' shares of
stock in the Garrett Company at the time of the merger. The individual defendants were the majority stockhoiders of the Garrett
Company. They were also its directors and likewise directors
of the company with which the Garrett Company merged. By
vote of the defendants, as majority stockholders of the Garrett
,Company, a merger with the other company was authorized,
plaintiffs voting against the merger. After the merger plaintiffs
believing themselves bound by the vote of the majority stockholders accepted stock in the consolidated company in exchange
for the stock previously held by them in the Garrett Company and
one of the plaintiffs was elected a director of the new company
and acted officially as such. Six months after the merger this
action was brought in which a judgment for defendants was had;
from which judgment plaintiffs appealed. (Garrett et al. v. Reid
Cashion Land & Cattle Co. et al. Arizona, 1928. 270 P. 1044.)
The right to consolidate or merge two corporations into one
is governed by statute or charter provisions. There was no
statute here authorizing such merger nor was there a provision
in the charter of the Garrett Company giving that right, so that,
in the first instance, what was done was without sanction of law.
The entire assets of a corporation cannot be sold or exchanged for
the stock of another corporation in accordance with a vote of the
majority of the stock of the corporation unless power to do so is
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given by law and the articles of incorporation of the business.
The exercise of such power in the absence of the conditions mentioned is illegal as against nonconsenting stockholders. Mason v.
Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U. S. 50.
The stock of the defendant company received by the Garrett
Company in payment for its assets cannot be forced upon dissenting stockholders of the latter company in a distribution of
its assets, they being entitled to received their share in money.
Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co. 228 Pa. 648.
The individual defendants being directors and majority
stockholders of both the defendant company and the Garrett Company were both the sellers and the buyers of the assets of the latter company and under the facts set out must be considered as actual if not technical trustees for the holders of the minority of
the stock. Jones v. Missouri Edison Electric Co., 144 Fed. 765. As
such trustees the defendants owed certain duties to the plaintiffs;
one being the duty not to sell to themselves the trust property,
and another being that they should disclose to the plaintiffs their
legal rights. Both of these duties devolving on the defendants
were breached by them and they cannot claim that acceptance by
the plaintiffs of the stock of the consolidated company was such a
ratification of the merger on the part of the plaintiffs as to relieve
them of liability. The term ratification implies knowledge of a
defect in the act to be confirmed and of the right to reject or
ratify it. Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539. Plaintiffs were without this necessrry knowledge and their action cannot be deemed
a ratification of the agreement.
While a mistake of law alone is not adequate ground for
equitable relief, the facts here bring this case within a well recognized exception to the general rule, that is, where a mistake by a
party as to his antecedent existing.legal rights, as distinguished
from a mistake as to the legal import of the act done, is shown,
equity will relieve such a party from the consequences of such a.
mistake. In Re McFarlin et al., 75 A. 281; Pomeroy on Equity
Jurisprudence (3d. ed.) sec. 849.
D. M. Donahue.
CRIMINAL LAW-In this case of State v. Purdis 221 N. W.
562 (Iowa) the defendant was charged with unlawful transporta-
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tion of liquor in violation of- the statute. While the case was
pending another information was sworn out against him charging
him with transporting liquor without proper labeling in violation
of Sec. 1936 of the Code. The last named action was the first prosecuted and the defendant was convicted and fined by the justic.e
of the peace. He appealed to the district court and was again
found guilty.
As a defense against the charge of unlawful transportation
of liquor the defendant pleaded the former judgment of transporting liquor without proper labeling as a formdr conviction for the
same offense. The court granted his request for a directed verdict on the ground that there had been a prior conviction and that
the defendant had been in jeopardy for substantially the same
offense as charged in the indictment. The case wos appealed by
the state and the supreme court affirmed the district c.ourt and
followed the rule laid down in State.v. Sampson 157 Iowa 257, 138
N. W. 473 where it was held that the effect of prosecuting first
the lesser offense where a larger offense has been committed and
could be prosecuted is a method of splitting a larger offense into
its lesser parts and that the state is bound by its election.
EQUITABLE RELIEF-The "Clean Hands Doctrine" of
Equity-Where equitable relief is sought in a court of equity, the
party seeking such relief must come in with clean hands.
In the case of Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Strayer, reported in 26 Fed. Rep. (2nd series) 727, plaintiff alleged that defendants had been banished from the organization, were wrongfully using its name and retaining in their possession property
and funds belonging to plaintiff; wherefore the plaintiff prayed
that defendants be enjoined from further use of its name, and
that they be required to account for and turn over all the property or funds in their possession which rightfully belong to the
plaintiff.
Defendants in their answer, after denying the allegations of
plaintiff's bill, alleged that they were members in good standing,
and also that plaintiff had been guilty of such gross violations of
law as would bar it from any relief in equity.
Judge Thomson, of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, denied plaintiff's prayer on the
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principle that he who comes into equity must come in with clean
hands. The .Court said:
"In view of all the facts disclosed by the evidence, the plaintiff corporation, stigmatized as it is by its unlawful acts and conduct, could hardly hope for judicial assistance in a court of the
United States, which is highly commissioned to extend to all
litigants before it, without distinction of race, creed, color, or
condition, those high guarantees of liberty and equality vouchsafed by the Constitution of the United States; a court whose
duty it is to recognize and uphold religious freedom as the first
fruit of civilization, to secure to every accused the right to a full
knowledge of the accusation against him, and a fair and impartial
trial of the issue before a jury of his peers; a court which fully
recognizes that this is a government of law, and not of men, and
that no man shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law."
J. Angelino.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-Parents have the right to advise
their son to leave his wife, if they act in good faith, honestly believing, for substantial reasons, that such advice is proper.
This was an action by Malinda Kadow against Wenzel
Kadow and Mary Kadow to recover damages for alienation of the
affections of plaintiff's husband by the defendants, who were the
parents of the husband. From a judgment for the plaintiff the
defendants appealed. This is a Wis. case decided in 219 N. W.
276.
The record showed in this case that there isn't any competent
evidence whatever that the parents advised their son to leave the
plaintiff. The most that can be said is that there is proof of
circumstances which plaintiff contends is sufficient to show that
the parents did advise separation. This proof consists of such
circumstances such as the failure of the defendants to give the
plaintiff a Christmas present or to invite her to meals in their
house or failure of the mother to answer the door bell when
the plaintiff called at the house of the parents.
The court held that the spouse, suing parents-in-law for
alienation of affections, has the burden of showing that their acts
and advice were controlling cause of separation, and result of
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malice and bad intent. Parents have a right to object to their
son's marriage, to refuse to make his wife a member of their family, and to advise him to leave her, if they hofiestly believe that
conditions demand separation, act in good faith, and have substantial reasons for believing .that such advice is proper
If parents, sued by their son's wife for alienation his affections, were actuated by reasonable parental regard for him, rather than unreasonable ill will towards plaintiff, in what they did,
but were wrong from the standpoint of best judgment, excusably
mistaking true situation, resulting injury is damnmm absque injuria.
The court said: "The relations of a parent and child in their
moral aspects, and legal as well, begin at the inception of life,
and so do not wholly end until life ends, and those relations carry
with them certain duties and privileges as to advice and protection and helpfulness in case of need, the observation of which is
so natural and so laudable and so essential to the family happiness
and welfare that acts ostensibly promotive thereof are not to be
lightly held to have a wicked purpose for their mainspring. Acts
done by a stranger might well be regarded as malicious, while
similar acts done by the parents would not give rise to a wellgrounded suspicion of bad intentions."
The law presumes that these parents did what they did for
the purpose of promoting the welfare of their son and not to
maliciously wrong this plaintiff. 186 Wis. 137; 202 N. W. 156;
147 N. W. 834, 835; 129 Am. St. Rep. 1082; 119 N. W. 179.
F. Earl Lamboley.
HUSBAND AND WIFE--In'this case of Gjesdahl v. Harmon
221 N. W. 639 the Plaintiff sues for the alienation of his wife's affections, to which the defendant entered a general denial. There
was a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed on the
ground that evidence of his own misconduct was not admissible
unless specially pleaded and that the court erred in admitting
such evidence under the general denial. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the lower court and applied the rule laid
down in a great number of cases of the state of Minnesota whose
holdings in substance are set out by this court in part of its opinion to the effect that, "The general denial put in issue all the

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

facts which the plaintiff was required to prove in order to establish his cause of action and under it the defendant could present
any evidence tending to show that if the plaintiff has lost the affections of his wife the estrangement resulted from his own misconduct. Such evidence was not in the nature of confession and
avoidance, but tended to show that the alleged loss of affections
resulted from causes from which the defendant was not responsible."
Marc Wonderlin.
INSURANCE-Authority of insurance agent to waive forfeiture for failure to pay premium within time specified-Methods
of establishing waiver of forfeiture by insurer.
Action by Annie Foscue, administratrix of John Foscue,
against the Greensboro Mutual Life Insurance Co. to recover the
amount of an accident insurance policy in the sum of $500.00
Foscue v. Greensboro Mutual Life Insirance Co. et al., Supreme
Court of North Carolina, 1928. 144 S. E. 689.
The policy in question had been issued on Sept. 8, 1925 by
the defendant to John Foscue, husband of the plaintiff, in consideration of a monthly premium of $3.40 paid in advance by the
insured. It was provided in the policy that after three months
from the date of the policy a grace period of ten days in payment
of premiums was allowable, the policy being forfeited in case of
failure to pay premiums within that time. The policy further
provided that no agent of the company had authority to change
the policy or waive any of its provisions, and that no change in
the policy should be valid unless approved by an executive officer
of the company, such approval being endorsed by him on.the
policy.
Plaintiff's husband was killed on the 19th of August, 1926.
It appeared that he had paid all premiums due on the policy on
or before the 10th day of each month up to the month of August,
but that on the 4th of that month, he had come to the agent of
the company, who wrote the policy and to whom he had previously paid the premiums, and informed him that he could not
pay the premium for that month. The agent declined to accept
a partial payment, but told the deceased that if he would take out
and pay for an industrial policy, he would extend the time of
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the premium on the existing policy until the next pay day of the
deceased, who took out the new policy, and had not paid the premium on the existing policy at the time of his death.
It was contended by the defendant that its agent, who was
merly a soliciting and collecting agent, had no-authority to waive
the provisions of the policy by agreeing to extend the time of payment of premiums. In passing on this contention, the court held
that courts will liberally construe in favor of an insured acts indicating an election to waive forfeitures, or an agreement to
waive them, because the courts do not favor forfeitures.. Especially is this true when the insured has relied and acted on such
waiver, which may be astablished by (1) express agreement, (2)
conduct or course of dealing, or (3) ratification. Turlington v.
Ins. Co., 137 S. E. 422; Dawson v. Ins. Co., 135 S. E. 34. By these
methods it may be shown that the power of an agent, expressed
in the policy, may have been enlarged by the insurer, but unless
there is evidence tending to show that his powers have been so
enlarged, the authority expressed must be regarded as the measure of his power. Oazsam v. Ins. Co., 71 S. E. 434. And when
one deals with an agent, it behooves him to ascertain correctly
the extent of his authority and power to contract.
The court further held that the authoriy of an agent whose
powers are limited, as were those of the agent of the defendant,
to waive the terms and conditions of written policies of insurance,
is ordinarily restricted to negotiations connected with the inception of the contract, and not to provisions of a written contract
which has already taken effect and been in force for a period of
time. Johnson v. Ins. Co., 90 S. E. 124. In this case there was no
evidence to show that defendant's agent had either express or
implied authority to waive the conditions expressed in the policy,
nor did it show a course of dealing from which waiver could be
inferred, since premiums had always been paid within the time
stipulated in the policy. From these facts and principles the
court reasoned that there was nothing to indicate a waiver by defendant of forfeiture of the policy, and that the plaintiff could not
recover its amount.
J. J. Canty.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-Landlord obligated to repair water pipes had, as regarded injury to tenant as result of con-
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tinued leakage, duty of reasonable inspection.
This suit is against the landlord.for personal injury sustained
by the wife of the tenant thru the fall of part of a plastered ceiling
in the demised premises upon the wife's head. Evidence shows
that water was leaking badly thru the kitchen ceiling and part of
the ceiling came down. Landlord was notified and contracted
with two colored masons to fix it. About ten months later, the
leak started again, landlord came and tested the ceiling with a
broom and pronounced it all right except the water pipes, which
he would fix stating that the water would stop. On January 5th,
1926, part of ceiling fell again this time on Mrs. Dulberger's head.
Clause of the written lease stated that the landlord was from
time to time, to examine and repair the water pipes, if any may
be broken.
The Judge instructed the jury that; "If you are satisfied by
the evidence that the defendant had no notice that the ceiling was
in a defective condition, then in such an event your verdict shall
be for the defendant."
The vice of this instruction is that it ignores any duty on the
part of the defendant to make any inspection himself of the conditions and predicates his liability solely on the fact of actual
notice.
It is, of course, a fundamental rule that a duty of care
normally involves the duty of making reasonable inspection at
proper times, and of reasonable diligence in making repairs, if
such reasonable inspection disclose defective conditions. As to
the waterpipes, this duty of reasonable inspection was recognized
by the express language of the lease and hence it follows that the
defendant's negligence could be inferred from lack of such inspection. It was clearly opened'to a jury to infer that if the ceiling fell on account of water they were entitled to find that defendant should have anticipated this as a possible result of the
leakage and should have made inspection accordingly. The instruction as given to the jury, erroneously limited the scope of
inquiry and to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. 143 A. 323 Didberger v.Radii.
Cases in accord; 222 Mass. 557, 129 N. Y. S. 681, 158 Ky. 118,
192 Ill. App. 348, 89 Conn. 169, 76 Cal. 173, 73 Md. 469, 268 Mo.
463, 19 Ga. app. 485, 209 S. W. 372, 157 N. Y. S. 642, 124 N. E.
283, 13 Ohio App. 285.
A. J. DeDario.

